Financial crises and market regulation by Jerry L. Jordan
F inancial crises are inevitable. Both
government intervention and market
innovations can influence the frequency
and severity of these episodes, but they
cannot eliminate them. Evolution toward
stronger political and economic institu-
tions is a discovery process, and the
sometimes dramatic financial market
adjustments labeled “crises” are an
unavoidable part of that process.
Government intrusions into financial
markets typically make financial crises
more serious. For the most part, official
programs seem designed to act as
sponges for absorbing risk exposures
from particular groups of economic
agents. This can lead market partici-
pants astray. Unless the resulting in-
centive to overinvest in risky projects is
offset by an effective program of super-
vision, agents are likely to misallocate
resources. Moreover, especially before a
crisis, a government may act as though
the capacity of its risk sponge is unlim-
ited. Only when that capacity is tested—
by calls on foreign exchange reserves, 
by demands on taxpayers through the
budget—does information about limits
emerge. Crisis ensues.
Financial crises are not predictable. If
they were, actions would be taken to
alter the predicted event, and the crisis
would be avoided. It is the surprise con-
tained in new, unexpected information
that sets off these episodes. If there were
no surprise, there would be no basis for
the sudden and substantial changes in
market prices of financial instruments
that are characteristic of crises.
 The Element of Risk 
and the Lessons of Failure
Financial outcomes always have an ele-
ment of uncertainty as well as an ele-
ment of risk. I choose the words uncer-
tainty and risk deliberately.1 They
describe two different kinds of exposure
to chance events. Uncertainty is impossi-
ble to describe probabilistically because
the distribution of possible outcomes
essentially is unknown. Therefore, expo-
sure to uncertainty cannot be hedged or
insured against. Gains and losses from
uncertain events are pure economic
rents. They are either borne by those
exposed to them or socialized in an act
of community greed—such as a steeply
progressive tax—or in an act of commu-
nity compassion—such as Red Cross,
Federal Emergency Management
Agency, or Marshall Plan assistance. We
cannot help but be surprised by the
occurrence of uncertain events. This is
why crises are unpredictable.2
Risk, on the other hand, is used for expo-
sure to the other kind of outcome. This
exposure can be described probabilisti-
cally, typically by using a model of some
sort to filter past experience. Exposure to
losses from risky events can be bought
and sold in the marketplace. An insur-
ance company will assume your expo-
sure to loss from the death of a partner in
return for an insurance premium. Finan-
cial institutions accept exposure to the
bankruptcy of debtors in return for a suf-
ficiently large risk premium. 
The existence of risky situations is not a
source of crises, for rational economic
agents will have incorporated calcula-
tions about potential outcomes into their
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Risks can be transferred from one party
to another, but they cannot be elimi-
nated. Exposure to loss from a partner’s
death can be shifted through an insur-
ance company to a diversified set of pol-
icyholders. Exposure to loss from lend-
ing can be shifted through a bank and the
FDIC to all insured depositors or general
taxpayers. Exposure to exchange-rate
changes can be shifted to someone else
through the organized exchanges or an
over-the-counter transaction or by gov-
ernment to general taxpayers. 
While individual parties can take actions
to reduce, minimize, or avoid their own
risk exposure, they can do so only when
another party is willing and able to bear
such risks. This is where government
behavior can become a problem. Usu-
ally, with the most sincere and honorable
of intentions, governments seek to
reduce, minimize, or eliminate the expo-
sure to risk of some constituent.
But allowing borrowers and investors to
suffer the losses incurred in a crisis is a
necessary and useful way to bring about
adjustments in the technology of invest-
ment. For example, adopting regulations
now that would proscribe practices that
appear to have made the 1997 Asian cri-
sis so severe should be unnecessary
because borrowers and lenders now
understand what happened and will not
be surprised again. If the parties were to
repeat the same behavior, markets would
discount the now-expected result, lead-
ing to substantial risk premiums in loan
and currency markets. There would be
no crisis because there would be no sur-
prise. More likely, however, borrowers
and investors would not repeat the
behavior that brought them grief the last
time. Instead, faced with markets that
extract more accurate premiums, they
would adopt new practices—that is,
innovations—some of which would
work and some of which would not.
Lessons learned in a crisis lead to
changes in behavior that prevent a repeat
of the conditions that led to the crisis.
The discipline exerted by global finan-
cial markets is beneficial in that it erodes
local resistance to more efficient domes-
tic markets. This is what the president of
Korea had in mind when he said recently
that there is a “silver lining” to the Asian
currency crisis. The restructuring and
reforming of the banking institutions
now occurring in Asia will leave them
better off. It would have taken much
longer to implement these reforms with-
out the “crisis atmosphere.” As a result,
these nations may soon have better
credit risk analysis, have better asset and
liability management techniques, be less
subject to politically connected bank
lending, and develop both internal audit
and external supervision that is essential
to sound banking.3
Crises are not desirable, but given that
they are inevitable, we would do well to
recognize that they lead to more efficient
financial systems—so long as the conse-
quences of risk taking are borne by those
responsible. 
 Government Intrusions and
Altered Incentives
Amyriad of government intrusions into
the marketplace—often in the form of
controls or guarantees—have altered the
incentives of participants to accept risk
exposures in affected markets. The
stated justification for regulation often is
a contention that a market failure or
imperfection is present. It is important to
understand that the perceived failure or
imperfection often was introduced by
another government intrusion. In that
circumstance, then, regulation or super-
vision may represent an effort to recreate
the competitive situation that would
have been present without the initial
government involvement in the market. 
Banking supervision is a prime example
of this effort. One of the most familiar
government intrusions into financial
markets of this century has been a gov-
ernment-supplied guarantee called
deposit insurance. Much of the regulation
governing firms covered by deposit
insurance is rationalized by the need to
neutralize the moral hazard introduced
by the insurance (that is, to reduce the
bank’s incentive to make risky invest-
ments because depositors, knowing that
insurance will bail them out in the event
of bank failure, do not demand a risk pre-
mium). The challenge always has been to
construct government regulations that do
not undermine the effectiveness of mar-
ket regulation—the discipline that
comes from having to compete.
The prior presence of guarantees by gov-
ernment has been a common element
underlying many episodes labeled crises.
Most often, such guarantees are intro-
duced as a well-intentioned effort to
shelter someone from exposure to the
costs of some type of risk. But those
costs and risks are real; as I mentioned
earlier, they are not eliminated by the
presence of government-supplied guar-
antees. They merely have been shifted to
someone else, usually in a very diffused
or opaque way. 
When governments offer guarantees,
one of two possible problems is created.
Because market participants engage in
behavior that is conditioned on the exis-
tence of the guarantee, government has
become a third contractual partner to
any transaction or agreement. In so
doing, government has caused someone
else—often the general taxpayer—to
bear a risk or cost, usually unknowingly.
Then, when unforecastable events force
government to make good on the guar-
antee, general taxpayers belatedly are
informed that they must incur a wealth
loss as a result of risk having been
shifted to them without their prior
knowledge and agreement. As long as
economic agents are unable to fully
internalize the potential costs of govern-
ment promises, financial markets are
not complete and thus are not efficient.
The alternative problem is that with-
drawal of a guarantee has the effect of
breaking a contract, thereby imposing
losses on someone. Abandoning an
exchange-rate peg is a good example of
this breach of contract. Many of the
events that have come to be labeled
financial or banking crises involve the
breaking of an explicit or implicit con-
tract or the withdrawal by government of
the offer to make new contracts—that is,
to provide guarantees—for the future.
Because past behavior was influenced by
past guarantees, the anticipated with-
drawal of the guarantees must be re-
flected in surprise adjustments of relative
prices. If these price changes are large
and occur within a short time interval, the
event is labeled a crisis.
For example, exchange-rate crises of the
early 1970s involved the withdrawal of
the U. S. guarantee that foreign govern-
ments could exchange dollars for gold at
a ratio of 35 to 1. Most exchange-rate
crises since then have simply been
reflections of unsustainable government
promises to redeem their own fiat cur-
rency for a foreign currency at pre-
announced rates.
Arelated aspect of crises concerns the
quality of a nation’s legal and financial
infrastructure. The surprise that triggersa crisis is some new piece of informa-
tion about the inability of debtors to
meet the terms of financial contracts.
Contracts are drawn up according to a
nation’s rules and regulations.4  If those
rules are lacking, unclear, or capable of
manipulation, then the opportunity for
surprise is greater than if the rules are
clear and stable.
Of course, I don’t mean to imply that all
crises are purely domestic, for there is
little point in trying to distinguish be-
tween an international crisis and a
domestic crisis. In the context of late
twentieth century global capital markets,
all financial markets have an interna-
tional element. In fact, global financial
asset portfolio managers can be thought
of as a new class of voters—stateless
citizens of the world, empowered to
roam the globe casting votes for and
against economic policies of the 200 or
so nation-states. As a result, a common,
and ultimately hopeful, element of crises
has begun to emerge. Various types of
government guarantees and promises—
on deposits, on foreign investments, on
domestic pensions—may be on the
“endangered species list” because so
many are being revealed as impossible to
honor. That is the lesson of Mexico in
1994–95 and Asia in 1997. That is what
the current political turmoil in Germany
may be all about. To the extent that
global capital market vigilantes are
becoming more effective in evaluating
the true costs of national governments’
promises, there should be less opportu-
nity for big surprises to bring on finan-
cial crises. 
 The Role of Market
Innovations
Crises also originate in failed market
innovations. For example, the collapse of
Long Term Capital Management last year
raised questions about the relationship
between financial innovations and crises.
Innovations are tests of ways of doing
things. Some succeed, but, just as surely,
others fail. Innovation is bound to bring
profits to some and losses to others.
That’s the way the market system works.
In the case of hedge funds, massive doses
of computer technology are combined
with finance theory and online, real-time
global information gathering to exploit
perceived anomalies in the prices of re-
lated financial instruments. This is a val-
uable role to play in perfecting markets,
and it can be a very profitable role if all
goes according to plan. However, as we
have seen in a few cases, it can be a very
unprofitable role if market prices do not
move toward the assumed past relation-
ships. The resulting losses can be multi-
plied manyfold to the extent such funds
are leveraged. As long as there is uncer-
tainty about market relationships, sur-
prises are capable of inflicting big losses
—perhaps big enough to be called crises.
Often, what gets missed in considering
new vehicles for risk bearing is that they
are methods of redistributing risk. Far
from increasing risk in the financial sys-
tem, as some have thought, they in fact
serve the primary purpose of unbundling
risk into its components and, thus, al-
lowing each type of risk to be managed
separately. This allows for specializa-
tion in risk bearing, as particular types
of risk can be transferred from one
party, who is averse to that risk, to
another party, who is less averse to that
risk. In this way, financial innovations
lower the cost of bearing risk by trans-
ferring it to those most willing, and pre-
sumably able, to bear it. However, some
financial innovations don’t work, and
investors lose money.
 Moral Hazard
“All that’s very well,” you will say, “but
haven’t many market participants come
away from the 1997 Asian crisis with an
entirely different lesson?” Namely,
“Don’t worry, ‘cause the IMF or some-
one else will pull our chestnuts out of the
fire next time—just as they did last
time.” Indeed, moral hazard is a real and
serious problem. Not only are financial
rescues likely to impede effective re-
forms, but they may also induce back-
sliding by encouraging an inattention to
risk that will make the next crisis worse
than the last one and thus induce more
pernicious moral hazard through even
stronger rescue efforts. Notice that moral
hazard involves intervention in the mar-
ket by a government-type authority that
relieves certain market participants of a
risk exposure by assuming that exposure
itself—that is, on behalf of the general
taxpayer. Especially in cases where the
risk transfer is only implicit, a big danger
is that the authority fails to create a super-
visory mechanism to manage or control
the risk it has assumed. At least the cur-
rent U.S. deposit insurance and lender-
of-last-resort institutions maintain an
active supervisory presence in the bank-
ing system. Without a supervisory pres-
ence, rescue efforts may promise relief in
the short run, but will be incapable of
keeping that promise in the long run.
 What Can Be Done
One approach to reducing the perceived
need for government agencies to mount
rescue operations is to strengthen private
market facilities for monitoring and deal-
ing constructively with potential crisis
situations. I’ll mention just two examples
of proposals that have been getting atten-
tion. One would improve the trans-
parency of the financial positions of
debtors through more consistent and
thorough financial disclosure. Creditors
could then derive earlier warnings of
trouble and force actions to limit losses.
Greater transparency is a desirable fea-
ture of efficient financial markets in its
own right. It is not clear that it would do
much good in preventing the kinds of
surprises that trigger financial crises;
however, it might aid in crisis resolution.
Another approach would include “collec-
tive action clauses” or other such provi-
sions in debt contracts that would facili-
tate action by private creditors to
reschedule, restate, or otherwise resolve
situations in which debtors need relief.
Especially with a growing share of credit
going directly to private firms rather than
through sovereign borrowers, creditors
should be better equipped to protect their
own interests without the intervention of
a government or international agency.
Of course, arming private investors will
not provide an incentive for them to use
new provisions as long as government
agencies appear willing to intervene and
achieve settlements on more favorable
terms than produced by private negotia-
tions. Given that a “just say no” inter-
vention policy is politically difficult,
judgment must be exercised in drawing
the line between productive and unpro-
ductive intervention.
Critical to any successful reform is a
reduction or elimination of uncertainty
arising from official responses to interna-
tional market disruptions. Governments
and international agencies might clarify
for markets what actions they would be
prepared to take, and under what circum-
stances. This could reduce incentives for
creditor runs on sovereign borrowers.
Moreover, it would increase the account-
ability of policymakers for their actions
and, in turn, reduce the attractiveness of
ex post creditor bailouts. This is by no
means as easy as it might sound. More
fruitfully, perhaps, agencies might
explore a structured format for precom-
mitment, comparable to that made famil-
iar in bank capital regulation.In summary, financial crises are
inevitable, I’m afraid. They are not
predictable. Typically, they arise from
financial mismanagement by govern-
ments, sometimes in response to failed
financial innovations. Moral hazard
compounds the inevitability of crises by
encouraging private inattention to risk
exposures without any assured supervi-
sory offset.
 Footnotes
1. This taxonomy was introduced by Frank
Knight. See Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971
(1921).
2.  Others describe the origins of crises by sug-
gesting that an objective distribution of possi-
ble outcomes of investments includes a sig-
nificant region of bad results. This region
(sometimes referred to as the “fat tail” of the
distribution) reflects the slight, but not negligi-
ble chance of simultaneous losses to many
investors in a crisis. Investors are shortsighted,
however, in ignoring this region of possibili-
ties when constructing portfolios and, there-
fore, surprised when it actually materializes.
3.  Or they may not. Suppose, instead, that
these governments heed the advice of those
who would throw more sand in the gears of
cross-border financing to discourage suscepti-
bility to capital flight. Aturnaround tax on
capital withdrawn within a few months or a
year of entering a country is a popular sug-
gestion. The approach might work, just as
capital controls seem to have worked for most
nations during and after World War II, but at
the cost of a less efficient global allocation of
capital. If regulation were to be part of the
reform process, it would make more sense to
remove regulations that discourage long-term
capital flows than to add regulations that dis-
courage short-term capital flows.
4.  An interesting exception has been pro-
posed by Howell E. Jackson in “The Selec-
tive Incorporation of Foreign Legal Systems
to Promote Nepal as an International Finan-
cial Services Center,” forthcoming in an
Oxford University Press symposium volume
on regulatory reform. His suggestion is that
firms be permitted to establish operations in
Nepal if they agree to abide by their home
countries’regulations and submit their
Nepalese operations to their home countries’
supervision.
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